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Abstract: In a recent press release of the 27
th
 of November 2013, the European Commission 
presented a package of five proposals to further strengthen procedural safeguards for citizens 
in criminal proceedings. Two of these proposals directly stem from the Council Procedural 
Roadmap’s Measure E on the (need for) special safeguards for suspected or accused persons 
who are vulnerable. Whereas the roadmap envisions improved attention for a vulnerable 
subject regardless of the origins of this vulnerability – be it due to age, mental or physical 
condition – the recent proposals indicate a clear differentiation between vulnerability based 
on the defendant’s age on the one hand, and the (adult) defendant’s mental or physical 
capacities on the other hand. As such, a proposal for a Directive for procedural safeguards 
for children was presented, whereas adult defendants in criminal proceedings had to be 
satisfied with a non-binding Recommendation. While it may indeed be defended that an 
accumulation of these sources for diminished capacity is not preferable, the Commission’s 
approach and underlining rationale seem equivocal. This article observes these recent 
initiatives from a dual viewpoint. First of all, they are looked at against the backdrop of the 
ongoing debate vis-à-vis mutual recognition and the introduction of auxiliary procedural 
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safeguards. The article, therefore, critically assesses the supposed link between the 
introduction of minimum procedural standards for a category of defendants which, precisely 
due to their vulnerability, seems less capable of being involved in criminal proceedings with a 
cross-border dimension. With the latter still the raison d’être for the mutual recognition 
principle and the basis for the EU to establish minimum rules, the article argues that the EU 
drifts further away from its Treaty based competence. Secondly, the Commission’s reasoning 
and subsequent policy choice to divide vulnerability based on the defendant’s age is analysed 
with respect to the indications coming from European policy makers and scholars alike. 
Without aiming to promote a viewpoint of vulnerability where one cause is hierarchically 
decisive over the other, the article makes a case for an (equally) adequate instrument for 
defendants with a mental disorder in criminal proceedings.    
Keywords: mutual recognition - procedural minimum rights - vulnerable defendants - age - 
mental condition - measure E 
I. Introduction 
Following the inception of the new era
2
of EU policy making in the field of criminal law since 
the Tampere milestones
3
 and the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition for 
judicial decisions throughout the EU, many a critical observer has lamented over the EU’s 
criminal justice policy’s emphasis on the simplification and acceleration of police and judicial 
cooperation without consideration for setting an acceptable standard for fundamental 
rights.
4
However, from the early conception of mutual recognition on both the Tampere 
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conclusions
5
and the Programme of Measures to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition
6
, it has been indicated that protecting defence rights by procedural safeguards 
operating to equivalent standards in all member states was seen from the outset as an integral 
part of the mutual recognition scheme.
7
 Notwithstanding this observation, the majority of the 
mutual recognition instruments that have emerged over the past decade has shown little 
consideration for the fundamental defence rights of the person involved.
8
With this initial 
critical response on the instruments
9
emerging under the mutual recognition umbrella and their 
lack of attention to fundamental procedural rights, the EU undertook a number of initiatives. 
Already in December 2000, the European Commission (the Commission), the Council and the 
Parliament signed the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
10
 (Charter, or CFREU) as an 
important (symbolic) step indicating the EU’s consistent commitment to fundamental rights 
and justice. In 2004, and following an initial Green Paper
11
, the Commission tried to give this 
commitment a more practical rendering in the field of criminal law by submitting the Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision (CFD) on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union.
12
Ambitious as the Proposal was, it was ultimately abandoned 
in 2007 after years of political disagreement.
13
 With the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty in 2009
14
 – which also means the Fundamental Rights Charter’s provisions 
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now have a binding legal force
15
 – the EU has taken up its ambition to strive for minimum 
procedural rights with renewed courage. At a time of declining trust in mutual recognition
16
, 
the Council, making use of the new legal basis provided by the Lisbon Treaty
17
, came up with 
a Resolution endorsing a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings.
18
 Based on a step-by-step approach, the Council 
endorses specific procedural rights in so-called measures. So far, this has resulted in six 
measures
19
 of which the first four have resulted in three Directives
20
 adopted by the Council 
and the Parliament. The fifth one, measure E on the (need for) special safeguards for 
suspected or accused persons that are vulnerable, has only very recently seen the creation of 
two separate instruments. With a press release on the 27
th
 of November 2013
21
, the 
Commission presented – as a part of a five-part proposal package – a proposal for a Directive 
on procedural safeguards for children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings
22
and a 
(Commission) Recommendation on procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons suspected or 
accused in criminal proceedings.
23
Hence, unlike the previous measures A to D, encapsulated 
in the three Directives, measure E has developed into two separate instruments, and appears to 
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have been split along the faultline of its definition of vulnerability. While the Commission 
envisions a firm Directive on special safeguards for children suspected or accused of crime, 
thus specifically envisioning safeguards for vulnerable persons due to their age, disordered 
adult defendants will, at least for now, have to make do with the general Recommendation. 
II. A critical note on harmonising criminal procedures for vulnerable defendants: is 
the EU moving further away from a cross-border dimension? 
Before delving into the Commission’s reasoning for this two-way approach, the general 
concept of introducing minimum standards for a specific category of defendants is to be 
assessed in terms of competency and feasibility. As indicated below, the previous measures 
and their subsequent Directives sparked a debate on the EU’s power to do so. Yet, where 
these measures have each targeted a specific type of procedural right – information, 
translation, access to legal advice, etc. – applicable to a general public of people involved in 
criminal proceedings, the initiatives flowing from the Roadmap’s measure E aim to enable a 
set of rights to a specified category of individuals based on their vulnerability. In order to 
legitimately do so, the Union should be clear in identifying how these initiatives would fall 
within the scope of competence bestowed upon it by its Treaties.   
II. 1. The Procedural Roadmap and competence issues  
With the Lisbon Reform Treaty, the principle of mutual recognition was formally given a 
treaty basis in Article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
24
 
Simultaneously, Article 82(2) TFEU outlines the relation with minimum harmonisation of 
criminal procedural law. In its second paragraph, the article clearly states that (only) “to the 
extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the 
European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules.” This description of the Union’s 
competence indicates a clear connection to mutual recognition for cooperation in criminal 
matters in a cross-border context as the guiding criterion for minimum rules to be established 
with a facilitating purpose. As such, the procedural roadmap’s measures and their subsequent 
Directives sparked a debate on their context and scope of operation, as the minimum 
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 Art 82(1) TFEU clearly states that “Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the 
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procedural standards they contained and promoted moved beyond a strictly cross-border 
dimension and were also applicable in strictly domestic situations.
25
With scholars hackling 
the Commission’s methodological choices “betraying a cavalier attitude to the limits of EU 
competence in this area” leaving itself open to “criticism of creeping competence”26 and 
stating that the current procedural rights debate has lost the link with cross-border situations
27
, 
it needs to be assessed whether or not the proposed Directive –as the most specific, binding 
outcome of measure E –  focusing on specific safeguards for children will be “a bridge too 
far”28 in the sense of having lost a clear connection with the cross-border context. 
II. 2. The proposed children Directive: Bending the rules…out of shape?  
With the proposed Directive for specific safeguards for children, the Commission specifically 
targets a group of vulnerable defendants who seem less likely to be involved in criminal 
proceedings in terms of cross-border cases. Articles 1 and 2 of the Proposal clarify the subject 
and scope of the Directive. On the one hand, it lays down minimum rules concerning certain 
rights of suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings that are children. As such, the 
proposal seemingly moves beyond the notion of a strict cross-border context and simply 
targets any child involved in any kind (both domestic and cross-border) of criminal 
proceeding. On the other hand, the Directive specifically targets children subject to a 
surrender procedure pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant EAW. The latter, therefore, 
defines the specific focus of the Directive on children in situations where their arrest and 
surrender are requested by a member state after they have fled to another member state in 
order to evade prosecution or the execution of a custodial sentence or detention order.
29
 A 
critical observer may point to the fact that minors may face a considerable threshold – ready 
access to cash, credit and debit cards, means of transportation, driver’s license, insurance, 
housing and accommodation opportunities, etc. – to effectively commit acts abroad resulting 
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 Ibid, p. 164.  
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 Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190. 
in a criminal offence with a cross-border dimension and the subsequent criminal proceedings 
and (mutual recognition of) the resulting judicial decisions. Truthfully, a similar observation
30
 
could be made regarding vulnerable adults. Yet, where the causal relationship between a 
person’s age and that person’s capacity to travel and cross borders seems fairly 
straightforward, it is, however, much more ambiguous to automatically assume the same for a 
mentally and/or physically impaired adult. The variety – and perceptibility – by which mental 
and/or physical features may restrict an adult in his capacity to travel unhindered (or 
unnoticed) make this a less evident exercise. As the current initiatives only promote a 
proposal for a binding Directive for children, the specific reasoning for such an instrument, as 
well as the basis for EU competence in this matter, need to be scrutinised against the backdrop 
of the cross-border threshold. In the impact assessment accompanying the proposed 
Directive
31
, the Commission has to admit that, in terms of cross-border cases, there is no 
precise information with regard to vulnerable persons arrested or prosecuted outside their own 
member state and that a 1% figure may be retained as representative of the cross-border cases 
concerning (all) vulnerable defendants.
32As such, the impact assessment’s figures do not seem 
to make a particularly strong case for necessary EU action regarding children in trans-
boundary situations.
33
Both observations – the disconnection with a strict cross-border context 
in the first part of the definition of the Directive’s subject and scope and the apparent limited 
practical use for an EU intervention in the area of European Arrest Warrants – raise the 
question as to which direction the EU is going with its procedural rights approach and which 
interpretation of Article 82(2) TFEU it upholds. The Commission’s stance on this subject is 
clarified in the impact assessment, where it is said that the cross-border element is not (or no 
longer) the primary concern of the initiated proposal for the Directive. In a separate paragraph, 
aptly titled Does the EU have power to act?, it is stated that: 
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33
 Moreover, in the interim report, the G|H|K (fn. 30) research team does not address the “limited information 
vis-à-vis cross-border cases” like the Commission upholds, but that “little evidence has been found of vulnerable 
persons being arrested or prosecuted outside of their own member states”.   
“This initiative will apply to all criminal proceedings irrespective of whether they 
present a cross-border element or not. The reason for this is that both the policy objectives as 
described below may only be met if minimum rules apply to all criminal proceedings. In order 
to improve mutual trust and thus judicial cooperation, judicial authorities need to be aware 
that sufficiently high standards apply across the board in the jurisdictions of other Member 
States. If Member States were at liberty to apply lower standards to purely domestic 
proceedings, the requisite of mutual trust between judicial authorities could not be boosted.”34  
Hence, the Commission seems to put its foot down in the ongoing debate on the necessary 
link with cross-border elements and mutual recognition of judicial decisions. With the      
cross-border element apparently no longer a prerequisite for the Union to intervene, the 
assessment document provides three patterns underpinning the EU’s competence to act: 
- First, the scope of Art 82(2) is applicable “not only to cross-border criminal 
proceedings, but also to domestic cases as a precise, ex ante categorisation of criminal 
proceedings as cross-border or domestic is impossible in relation to a significant 
number of cases.”35 
- Secondly, the citation above states that minimum standards are necessary on a 
domestic level in order to build up confidence and trust between judicial authorities in 
case of cross-border cooperation. 
- Thirdly,  an interesting point is made where the Commission states: 
“As concerns the need to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens, the 
enactment of minimum rules for cross-border proceedings only, far from addressing 
the problem, would create two different classes of defendants in criminal proceedings, 
one with more rights than the other; this distinction, made on the basis of the       
cross-border nature of the procedure, would lead to unreasonable differentiation and 
would eventually be detrimental to the protection of fundamental rights. In addition, 
when the matter is linked to EU law, the Charter guarantees rights to everyone 
suspected of a criminal offence, whether involved in cross-border or purely national 
proceedings.”36  
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 Ibid, para. 3.  
The first two statements tend to follow the type of classic reasoning previously witnessed in 
the preceding Directives.
37
 The first statement promotes the persuasion that it is better to be 
safe than sorry, and to prepare your domestic situation – i.e. justice system – up to an 
acceptable standard for when your criminal proceedings become of a cross-border nature. The 
second one follows a similar reasoning and aims to build up the trust necessary for smooth 
cross-border cooperation by working through a bottom-up method of inserting minimum 
standards on a domestic level, so that member states – when the time comes – will be able to 
be confident in each other’s legal systems when issuing a cooperation measure.38Very similar 
to the reasoning at the time of construction of the previous Directives, the question remains as 
to how this should and will be appreciated given the indication above that very few suspects 
or offenders who are minors find themselves entangled in cross-border criminal proceedings.  
The third statement, however, firmly moves away from the cross-border perspective and 
defends the more radical notion of more and better justice for all throughout the EU.
39
 The 
rationale for this is that confining the procedural minimum rights within a strict cross-border 
context would create a discriminatory context where individuals involved in domestic 
criminal proceedings may or may not be worse off. Moreover, the Commission makes a case 
for the notion that, as long as member states are acting within the scope of application of EU 
law, the EU’s fundamental rights – via the Charter – are applicable regardless of a domestic or 
cross-border context. On both accounts, these are controversial arguments. In the first 
statement, the Commission implies that it no longer suffices to accept the diversity of (and 
between) the member states’ internal criminal justice systems because they result in a 
discriminatory situation in which an individual, depending on the legal system applicable to 
him and whether or not he falls under a cross-border situation (and hence possible EU 
competence), is able to rely on either more or fewer rights. This seems poles apart from the 
equivalence idea
40
 the Commission promoted at the start of the new era of cooperation in 
criminal matters where differences were acceptable because of the presupposed trust that a 
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European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - 
Mutual recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters, COM/2000/0495 final, 2000, point 3.1, para. 1 & 2. 
Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52000DC0495:EN:HTML.  
decision taken by a member state would always – throughout the diversity – adhere to an 
acceptable minimum (fundamental) standard. This may be understood in two ways: either the 
domestic standards fail to meet that presupposed minimum standard, therefore undermining 
the basic premises of mutual recognition and prompting an adequate response, or the 
Commission still considers the equivalence concept as intact, but wishes to push further for an 
EU-wide minimum harmonisation of criminal law beyond a cross-border context, therefore 
(out)stretching the competence interpretation of Art 82(2) TFEU. In the second statement, one 
cannot help but notice the ambiguity of the Commission’s reasoning as it seeks to apply the 
CFREU beyond the condition that member states are acting within the scope of EU law.
41
  
According to Article 51(1), the Charter is addressed to member states only when they are 
implementing Union law.
42
 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in its 2013 
preliminary ruling in the case of Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson confirmed that this 
covers all situations falling within the scope of Union law;
43
 hence, the Commission’s 
statement that the Charter’s provisions apply in both a domestic and cross-border context is 
viable. Before this can be the case, however, it has to be established that an EU legal act calls 
for national implementing measures and thus that the Union had the material competence to 
exercise and submit such a measure.
44
 As such, for the Commission, the sting is in the tail: on 
the one hand the delineated threshold for, and poor evidence of, cross-border situations 
involving vulnerable defendants puts pressure on the necessity (and therefore competency) to 
act under an Article 82(2) mandate. On the other hand, and more importantly, the 
Commission itself has made it clear that it wishes to apply a different rationale for introducing 
minimum standards for minors as vulnerable defendants, aberrant of Article 82’s provisions. 
As such, the Commission wishes to derive a competency beyond the Treaty-based scope of 
Article 82(2) by referring to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Yet, this 
very instrument is applicable only in cases the EU has a legitimately established material 
competency to act in. Suffice it to say that a competency built on such circular reasoning has 
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feet of clay. Whereas the EU’s objective vis-à-vis procedural minimum rights is a noble cause 
in its own right, the fallacious competency discourse could thwart the entirety of the 
undertaking by culminating into a standoff on the principle of subsidiarity and the overstretch 
of EU power between the Union and the member states, not generally inclined to accept far-
reaching interference with regard to their own national laws and policies.
45
 
III. A brief look at the Commission Recommendation  
In order to fully grasp the Commission’s progress in its quest for procedural safeguards for 
vulnerable persons suspected or accused in criminal proceedings, the Recommendation
46
 
requires some brief assessment. In general, the instrument seems innovative in that it 
specifically aims at a presumption of vulnerability and the identification of such vulnerability 
in persons involved in criminal proceedings.  
First and foremost, the Commission recommends member states to foresee a presumption of 
vulnerability for certain persons in their legal systems, as will be indicated in the chapters 
below; this presumption particularly focuses on vulnerability as a result of mental disorders 
and to a lesser extent physical impairments.
47
Furthermore, it promotes the prompt and 
qualitative identification and recognition of such persons by ensuring that all competent 
authorities may have recourse to a medical examination by an independent expert, and that 
police officers, law enforcement and judicial authorities competent in criminal proceedings, 
should receive specific training to adequately deal with vulnerable persons.
48
 Apart from these 
novel suggestions, recommendations are made to ensure the right to medical assistance and 
the audio-visual recording of questionings.
49
 An intriguing aspect is that the Recommendation 
seems to draw from the English & Welsh method where it promotes the presence and 
assistance of a(n) (appointed) legal representative or appropriate adult during police station 
and court hearings.
50
 A direct link with the cross-border context is made where the instrument 
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subject to European Arrest Warrant proceedings has the specific procedural rights referred to 
in this Recommendation upon arrest”.51 
The identified recommendations have the potential to have a beneficial effect on the 
identification of a vulnerable person and thus ameliorate the procedural rights and effective 
participation in (cross-border) criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, further consolidation is 
needed given the general and vague nature of some of these suggestions. A minimum 
qualitative definition of an independent expert should be provided and the specific training 
needs to be specified and matched again with a qualitative threshold.  The presumption of 
vulnerability still leaves too much room for interpretation as to how and where this 
presumption needs to be ‘foreseen’ and one may wonder whether generalising a certain 
member state’s specific approach across the diverse European countries will be 
counterproductive. From the mental perspective – and one clearly envisioned as a primordial 
part of the presumed vulnerability according to recommendation seven – the immense variety 
by which mental disorders may impact on proceedings implies that additional safeguards in 
order to ensure the defendant’s procedural rights will have to be more tailor-made. For now 
the biggest obstacle to effective results and improvements, however, remains the instrument’s 
non-binding form. As a purely suggestive instrument, it leaves the addressees with the mere 
suggestion to report back and inform the Commission on the follow-up on the 
recommendations within 36 months of its notification.
52
 
IV. Establishing vulnerability through diversity and demonstrated needs.  A plea for 
an adequate approach towards mentally disordered defendants 
Notwithstanding the critical observations above, the core of the initiatives – creating special 
safeguards for vulnerable defendants as a specific category of people involved in criminal 
proceedings in need of extra attention and defence opportunities – serves a noble goal. Apart 
from the discussion on the EU’s ambiguous competency tactics, however, the policy choices 
made with respect to this goal need assessment. In the previous chapter, the Commission’s 
Recommendation was evaluated on its flaws and merits, the biggest obstacle remaining its 
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essentially non-binding character. The following paragraphs assess the Commission’s 
rationale – based on three propositions – for its policy choices and make a case for an 
effective and adequate instrument for mentally disordered defendants. From a competency 
and policy perspective, such an instrument seems both feasible and imperative.   
IV. 1. Vulnerability is in the eye of the beholder. Under identification of mental 
impairments in criminal proceedings   
Measure E aims to show special attention to suspected or accused persons who, due to age, 
mental or physical conditions, cannot understand or follow the content or the meaning of the 
proceedings.
53
As such, the measure comprises a broad spectrum of possibly vulnerable 
defendants. The presented instruments, however, make a distinction from the start by 
delineating said vulnerability along the line of the age of the person involved. Up to a certain 
age limit, it is presumed (and for good measure: rightfully so) that every minor suspect or 
offender – with or without an additional mental or physical condition – presents a specific 
chance for vulnerability. Once this limit is reached, the specific mental or physical condition(s) 
from which a(n) (adult) person involved in criminal proceedings suffers need to be identified 
and assessed in order to establish this individual’s vulnerability. Both evaluations, while 
undoubtedly influencing an individual’s capacity to understand and participate in the 
proceedings, are based on considerably different grounds and hence require a diversified 
approach. When assessing an individual as vulnerable as identified by measure E in a strictly 
domestic context, the starting point will always be the screening and detection of said 
vulnerability once the individual has been apprehended. Hence, an immediate discrepancy 
becomes clear. Where a person’s age consists of an objectified constatation54 and, similarly, a 
diminished capacity to equivalently participate in the proceedings due to a physical condition 
could be considered as being sufficiently objectionable
55
, the determination of a diminished 
capacity based on a mental condition still forms a contentious undertaking.
56
 To a large extent 
less distinct upon first sight and subsequently more complex to evaluate in terms of capacity 
and vulnerability, establishing the mental condition of a person involved in criminal 
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proceedings– and acting accordingly –constitutes an exceptionally sensitive and complex 
exercise. Without compromising the vulnerability of suspects or offenders of minor age or 
with a physical impediment and by no means disclaiming their need for specific safeguards, it 
remains the case that the very starting point for establishing vulnerability remains much more 
problematic for (adult) defendants with a mental disorder. For one, various EU-wide studies 
have indicated the existing diversity, but also the substandard level, of the screening and 
detection mechanisms available in the member states’ legal systems. 57  Hence, from the 
starting point of an adequate establishment of vulnerability, an individual involved in criminal 
proceedings while subjected to a mental disorder, may be deemed as being in a 
disadvantageous position. 
This lack of identification of adults with a mental disorder has a potentially grave impact on 
the data of vulnerable defendants in cross-border criminal proceedings. The scarcity of 
information
58
 on detected vulnerability due to a mental impairment combined with 
substandard screening methods and a general lack of identification imply, at least, the 
possibility of a much higher number of mentally vulnerable persons involved in cross-border 
proceedings that slip through the net. The observation that “overall, the shortage of evidence 
in the field of psychiatric prevalence and mental health care in prisons is nothing less than 
dramatic” and that “even the most rudimentary health reporting standards for mental health 
care in prisons are lacking almost everywhere in Europe”59 opens the door to gross neglect of 
mentally-oriented vulnerability both in domestic and cross-border context and both for 
juvenile and adult defendants. From a policy point of view, this necessitates prompt and 
adequate EU action in order to guarantee effective procedural safeguards.
60
 Moreover, 
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contrary to the above mentioned issues surrounding the Directive for children inciting the 
Commission to boldly twist the Treaty based competence, the (scarcity of) statistics on 
mentally ill individuals seem to be in the Commission’s favour. A potentially considerable 
group of (adult) individuals with a mental impairment involved in criminal proceedings 
remains undetected, even across the borders of the Union’s member states. Hence, there 
would be no need to overstretch Article 82(2) TFEU’s interpretation to vindicate EU action in 
this specific area.      
IV. 2. The lack of an overarching definition for a vulnerable adult. A legitimate 
justification or a practical excuse?  
Notwithstanding this considerable part of the European population potentially remaining 
unidentified and insufficiently safeguarded, the Commission, in the Executive Summary of 
the Impact Assessment, explains its choice to stick to a recommendatory instrument by stating 
that the difficulty to determine an overarching definition – since there is no international or 
European legal instrument defining a vulnerable adult – and the existence of fewer relevant 
international standards and provisions for vulnerable adults ruled out taking legally binding 
action.
61
While it is true – and alarmingly so – that there are no binding international or 
European norms and standards that specifically address vulnerable adults
62
, the impact 
assessment omits to clarify why this should result in a strictly non-binding Recommendation, 
despite the “rather lukewarm appreciation of the value of such an approach”63the assessment 
itself indicates
64
, just as it refuses to engage in an in-depth analysis, why the difficulty of a 
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lacking definition should halter the construction of binding legislative initiatives, or why the 
option of defining the term vulnerable adult was discarded.
65
 Once again indicative of the 
assessment’s employed spurious rationale, the European Parliament’s Ex-Ante Impact 
Assessment Unit further wonders “why this difficulty [the lack of a definition] has not 
stopped other pieces of legislation already being adopted in the same field with specific 
provisions referring to vulnerable persons (e.g. Directive 2013/48/EU on access to a 
lawyer)”.66 So rather than to seize the opportunity to (at least) investigate the viability of a 
common EU-wide understanding of vulnerability, the Commission suffices by stating that it is 
difficult and therefore unfeasible.
67
 
In the Recommendation, somewhat paradoxically, the Commission itself seems to suggest a 
general definition for a vulnerable person by stating that such a vulnerable person is a 
“suspected or accused person who is not able to understand and to effectively participate in 
criminal proceedings due to their age, their mental or physical condition or disabilities.”68 Yet, 
by already delineating a presupposed –due to general European consensus – vulnerability for 
children, this common definition would primordially focus on adults with either a mental or 
physical impairment. As aforementioned, the hiatus of a binding instrument comprises a 
particular risk for mentally disordered individuals as they consist of a less apparent and 
consistently under-identified population. In order to guarantee their procedural safeguards, an 
adequate presumption of vulnerability for this particular population is needed. The 
Commission would not have to start from scratch to create a presumption of vulnerability in a 
context of mental illness, as it may avail itself of already existing doctrines. Both the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
69
 and the European Court’s case law70, have 
spoken out regarding persons with an unsound mind. While the Court stated in its Winterwerp 
judgment that the Convention did not define what is to be understood as a person of unsound 
mind and that such a definitive description or interpretation cannot be given due to the 
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continually evolving concept of mental illness (and the society’s attitude towards it)71, it does 
provide for certain safeguards such as the need for objective medical expertise to establish a 
true mental disorder before a competent national authority, the degree-threshold for a mental 
disorder to warrant compulsory confinement and the need for a disorder’s persistence to 
validate a continued confinement.
72
 Departing from the notion that a definitive description of 
a mental disorder is neither feasible nor preferable, the EU should not hide behind it, but 
focus on creating awareness and recognition of vulnerability due to such a disorder. In the 
first place, this should be achieved through prompt, objective and qualitative identification of 
the latter, subsequently enabling the defendant’s fundamental (procedural) rights. Once again 
in a conflicting, perhaps even perplexing rationale, the Commission does provide a suggestive 
definition of presumed vulnerability for “[in particular] persons with serious psychological, 
intellectual, physical or sensory impairments, or mental illness or cognitive disorders, 
hindering them to understand and effectively participate in the proceedings.”73 On the one 
hand, dismissing any effective action on the subject as unattainable because of the definition 
crux, only to provide two workable definitions on the other, seems to imply a convenient, 
practicable reasoning by the Union, rather than one instigated by a legitimate cause to tackle 
vulnerability in a comprehensive manner. With these considerations in mind, it seems an 
inexcusable omission to leave – in particular – mentally impaired defendants without a 
legitimate and effective instrument simply due to the practical consideration that it would be 
an arduous task to do so.  
IV. 3. The need for an integrated approach  
A final observation regarding the Commission’s delineated approach between children and 
the ‘bulk’ of other vulnerable individuals, is that physical or mental impairment – unlike the 
distinction between a minor and adult defendant – is unrestricted by age. By creating a 
powerful instrument-to-be with the proposed Directive for minors while neglecting to do so 
on a general basis for all possible types of vulnerability, the Commission undermines the 
efficacy of the Roadmap’s goal to create procedural safeguards for all vulnerable defendants, 
but also the proposed Directive itself. Once more with reference to the difficulty of detecting 
a – prevalent – mental illness, attributing vulnerability solely on an age criterion would forego  
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the reality that (juvenile) delinquency is often related to mental health related issues.
74
 By the 
same token, a relatively convenient establishment of a person’s – be it of minor or adult age – 
vulnerability due to physical incapacity could be made complex by coexistent mental illness. 
Hence, an integrated approach imposes itself in order to guarantee that all fronts are covered 
in guaranteeing necessary safeguards for the vulnerable population in criminal proceedings. 
The Commission’s Recommendation, unrestricted by the age criterion of the proposed 
Directive, is satisfactory in this perspective, but ultimately remains a mere suggestive, non-
binding entity. An effective instrument is imperative to ensure an integrated approach towards 
vulnerability.   
V. Conclusion 
With the two new initiatives stemming from the Roadmap’s measure E, the Commission 
embarks on a noble mission of enhancing the protection for a category of defendants in 
criminal proceedings that are specifically vulnerable due to age, mental or physical conditions. 
Rightfully aiming at providing better procedural safeguards, the Commission’s policy choices 
and underlying rationale indicate a number of flaws with the potential to jeopardise the 
entirety of the set out goals. In the first place, the Commission risks overplaying its hand by 
flexibly interpreting Treaty and Charter-based provisions in order to establish a newfound 
type of – possibly overstretched – competence. Proposing legally binding legislation 
consisting of a set of procedural rights for an age-related category of persons less likely to be 
involved in cross-border criminal proceedings while justifying this approach through a 
newfound competence severed from the basis provided in the TFEU might just be the 
proverbial bridge too far for the member states. On the one hand, pushing the envelope 
competency-wise, the Commission in contrast seems terribly prudent when delineating its 
tactics to combat vulnerability in all its (other) aspects. Full attention is dedicated to children 
as vulnerable defendants due to the consideration that a widespread consensus already exists 
on their vulnerability, definitions and handling. The ascertainment by the Commission that no 
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binding international norms and standards directly deal with other vulnerable defendants, 
however, does not spark an in-depth comprehensive instrument, but prompted them to 
introduce an approach that in their own words has very limited potential of factually 
improving anything for the better on a procedural level. As a result, the choices made         
vis-à-vis the vulnerability policy leave a bitter feeling. Restricting the proposed Directive to 
children falls short of adequately tackling issues related to vulnerability throughout the EU, 
where, in order to justly deal with vulnerable subjects, an effective identification of their 
cause of vulnerability is necessary. A most pressing issue, and admittedly a complex one to 
grasp, is the overarching role of mental illness in a criminal context. Unrestricted by age, 
gender or physical capacity, mental disorder is often a coexistent stimulant for aberrant, 
possibly criminal behaviour that remains woefully under- or inadequately detected. Hence, 
there is a dire need to create additional safeguards as regards screening, detection and 
identification for both adults and children impaired by a mental condition as they tend to be 
less obviously visible and risk slipping through the net. By the same token, the problematic 
screening and detection – and as such, lack of identification – of mentally disordered adults in 
combination with a more probable cross-border mobility would imply that the creation of a 
binding instrument would be more in accordance with the terms of competency embedded in 
Article 82(2) TFEU.    
